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Dr. Percy Walker, director of Britain’s Ministry of Aviation accident 
inspector branch in the early 1960’s, was said by The Sunday Times to have 
researched more crashes than anybody else in the world (Air Correspondent, 
1962). In the same article he was quoted as saying that eyewitnesses to aviation 
accidents are “almost always wrong” (p. 8). Contemporary accident investigation 
textbooks employ more measured language (Strauch, 2002; Wood & Sweginnis, 
2006) but they do note that inconsistences are often found among eyewitness 
accounts. In the 50 years since Dr. Walker’s statement, research into eyewitness 
testimony has advanced considerably; however there remains a paucity of 
published empirical studies regarding the validity and reliability of aviation crash 
witness statements. 
We have long known eyewitness testimony to be less than completely 
reliable (Loftus 1996; Toglia, Reed, Ross & Lindsay, 2006).  Over a century ago 
Münsterberg (1908) gave many examples, including the time a revolver was fired 
during a lecture. The dramatic scene was all play-acting, part of a controlled 
experiment. Similar experimental techniques are still used in eyewitness research, 
but have limitations (Memon, Mastroberardino & Fraser, 2008). Field and 
archival techniques further expand our understanding (Wells, Memon & Penrod, 
2006), and have included studies of witness records of large traumatic events such 
as the Titanic sinking (Riniolo, Loledin, Drakulic & Payne, 2003), the Oklahoma 
City Federal Building bombers (Memon & Wright, 1999) and the 9/11 attacks 
(Altmann, 2003). But despite over 100 years of research, and more than 2,000 
papers published on eyewitness identification in the past 30 years, studies on 
aircraft accident eyewitness reports remain scarce. Dodge (1983) found variability 
in witness accounts of a major aviation crash, but the sample size (n = 20) was 
relatively small and all witnesses were on-board survivors of the crash they were 
describing. 
There are many variables known to influence eyewitness accuracy 
(Brewer & Wells, 2011). Memory of an event can by changed by exposure to 
misinformation about the event (Zaragoza & Lane, 1994), by reactivating the 
memory (St. Jacques & Schacter, 2013), by trauma and perceived culpability 
(Foster & Naylor, 1999), by social conformity (Edelson, Sharot, Dolan & Dudai, 
2011), and by talking about the event (Wright, Memon, Skagerberg & Gabbert, 
2009). However people evaluating the statements are often not aware of these 
issues. A review of eyewitness reliability in motor vehicle crashes (Robins, 2009) 
notes that juries show a “marked preference” for eyewitness evidence over what 
should be the more compelling physical evidence. A survey of potential jurors in 
the District of Columbia (Schmechel, O’Toole, Easterly & Loftus, 2006) finds 
they “misunderstand how memory generally works and how particular factors … 
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affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony” (p. 194). Even informed 
psychologists may be misled. Chan, Thomas and Bulevich (2009) show “real-life 
eyewitness memory may be even more susceptible to misinformation than is 
currently envisioned” (p.66). 
Following a summary of several aircraft accidents that seem to provide 
some qualitative support to claims of mistaken eyewitness accounts, we subject 
the extensive archival witness record of a major aviation accident to statistical 
analysis. The aim of the study, to demonstrate the reliability of eyewitness reports 
to a major aviation accident, is achieved with several statistical analyses 
converging towards a conclusion of unreliability. 
Qualitative Examples of Aviation Accident Eyewitness Validity and 
Reliability 
There are many aircraft accident reports where eyewitnesses are generally 
in agreement with each other and the final accident probable cause; for example 
the takeoff of a DC-9 seen by 100 external observers where “none of the 
witnesses described smoke or flames coming from any part of the airplane other 
than the right engine” (National Transportation Safety Board, 1987). Sometimes a 
single eyewitness can supply otherwise ephemeral evidence, as for example the 
farmhand who reported that something fell off an accident aircraft: “Whizzed past 
me [h]ead it did, and when I dug it out of ground a large chuck of ice it were” 
(Brown, 1962, p. 38). The probable cause of the crash was determined to be 
inflight icing based largely on the farmhand’s account. However there are also 
many well-recorded cases that support the late Dr. Walker’s contention, cases 
where aviation accident eyewitnesses report seeing things that did not happen or 
substantially confuse the order of events. 
At an airshow in 1952, a supersonic fighter disintegrated in the air causing 
the death of both crew and 29 spectators (Staff, 1952). Over 100,000 people 
witnessed the accident. A public appeal was put out for witness accounts and 
photographs to help solve the mystery, resulting in several thousand letters being 
collected. Rivas and Bullen (2008) found “many of the accounts are touchingly 
detailed and well intentioned, but the whole of the vast mail was of little use” (p. 
186). The vital clue that led to determination of probable cause was supplied by a 
cine film. The in-flight breakup happened in less than a second, and almost all the 
eyewitnesses, including experienced pilots, gave grossly inaccurate accounts 
when compared to the film record.  
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Investigating the mid-air collision of a passenger DC-9 and a Marine 
Corps F-4 the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found “witnesses in 
the area of the accident gave widely varying accounts” (NTSB, 1972). Five 
people described both aircraft on steady courses prior to the collision, but fifteen 
people described the fighter aircraft in a rolling or evasive maneuver prior to the 
collision. 
Wilikinson (1977) quotes an eyewitness to a crash describing a light 
aeroplane just before impact as “heading right toward the ground—straight down” 
(p.102). However photographs of the crash site clearly showed the aeroplane 
plane hit flat and at a low enough angle to skid for almost 1,000 feet. Two expert 
eyewitnesses to a crash on takeoff of a MD-82 stated that the wing flaps were 
extended, but the Board determined the flaps were in fact not extended (NTSB, 
1988). What was initially reported as a possible bombing of a B767 due to many 
eyewitness accounts of the plane first exploding in fire (Johnson, 1991; Kelly & 
Elliott, 1991) turned out to be caused by the uncommanded activation of an 
engine thrust reverser (Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee, 1993). 
When a fuel tank explosion caused a B747 to descend in pieces from 
13,000 feet, the fireball was seen by hundreds of people, about one-third of who 
reported that they observed a streak of light moving upward in the sky (NTSB, 
2000). However there was no evidence that a missile struck the plane, and 
physical examination of the wreckage unequivocally supports the cause as a fuel 
tank explosion. Thirty-eight of the witnesses described a streak of light as 
ascending vertically. Forty-five reported that a streak moved to the east, 23 that it 
moved to the west, 18 that it moved to the south, and 4 that it moved to the north. 
When a MD-82 crashed on takeoff initial reports included eyewitness 
accounts of an engine catching fire as the aeroplane heading down the runway 
(Goodman, Todd & Koch 2008; Naughton & Strange, 2008). However analysis 
showed that engine performance was normal on takeoff, and that the cause of the 
crash was failure to set the flaps (CIAIAC, 2008). 
A Cessna 310R that crashed following a steep descent was observed by 
several witnesses. All described to the NTSB (2012) a nose-down, vertical 
descent to ground contact. However some described the engine sound as “full 
throttle,” “wide open,” “really loud,” and “never let up on [the] throttle” But 
others stated the engine was “puttering” or “quit” before the descent (para. 3). 
One witness believed he had seen a meteorite. A veteran aviation journalist wrote 
of the eyewitness accounts, “as is often the case, they disagreed” (McClellan, 
2013, p. 84). 
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Considering these examples, it’s understandable that not just journalists 
are unconvinced by accident eyewitness accounts. NTSB Member John Goglia 
declared that eyewitness reports of aeroplane crashes are often mistaken 
(Halbfinger & Wald, 2003), and NTSB spokesperson Ted Lopatkiewicz asserted 
“eyewitness testimony at a plane crash … is unreliable” (Wald, 2002, p. 5). These 
professional opinions are not however shared by the general public (Simons & 
Chabris, 2011). Eyewitness reports are often given prominence in press reports 
and used in legal actions. Philosophers have long grappled with the dual ideas of 
human conviction and disagreement, with Renouvier declaring in 1859 that 
“properly speaking, there is no certainty; there are only people who are certain” 
(Schulz, 2010, p. 159). Decades of experience have led aviation crash 
investigators to discount eyewitness accounts, and instead rely on flight recorders, 
radar recordings and physical evidence to determine cause. There are, however, 
no systematic published studies of aviation crash eyewitness accounts to validate 
investigators beliefs. This is due in part to the problems of creating a controlled 
experiment. It is much easier for a psychology lab to stage a fistfight or a robbery, 
than it is to stage a burning airliner coming out of the sky. 
Description of AA587 Crash 
On the morning of November 12th, 2001, an American Airlines wide-body 
A300 jet climbed into clear sunny skies over New York City on what was planned 
to be a routine flight. A few minutes later flight 587 violently pitched down and 
crashed into the middle of a residential neighborhood (Kleinfeld, 2001). All 260 
people on board died, along with an additional five people on the ground. Coming 
two months after the 9/11 attacks, there were initially fears that this may have 
been another terrorist attack. A large NTSB and Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) effort was mounted to determine what happened, an investigation that 
included interviewing hundreds of eyewitnesses. 
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of flight 587’s accident was 
co-pilot rudder inputs that resulted in the vertical stabilizer breaking off from the 
fuselage and falling into Jamaica bay (NTSB, 2004). The loss of a primary 
aerodynamic flight control surface and substantial change in center of mass 
caused the jet to pitch down and dive towards the ground. Recovery was 
impossible. Fifteen seconds after rudder separation the plane crashed into the 
quiet Belle Harbor suburb of Queens, New York, a three-kilometer (1.8 mile) by 
one kilometer (0.6 mile) (at its widest) neighborhood located on a barrier 
peninsula between Jamaica Bay and the Atlantic Ocean (figure 1). The majority 
of the aircraft made landfall close to the geographic center of the community, 
destroying three homes and damaging six others in a post-impact fire. Both 
4
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 1 [2014], Iss. 4, Art. 9
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol1/iss4/9
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2014.1040
engines separated from the wings before impact, landing about 200 metres from 
the main wreckage. The accident was not survivable for the airplane occupants. 
 
Figure 1. Photograph of Belle Harbor. Taken from an altitude of 2000 feet over 
the Atlantic Ocean, looking northwest with Jamaica Bay and New York City in 
the background; it was into the center of this neighborhood that American 
Airlines 587 crashed. (Photo by author D. English.) 
 
The weather that morning was clear and brisk. Immediately before the 
accident JFK airport reported the wind to be from 310º at 11 knots, visibility 
unrestricted, a few clouds at 4,300 feet with a temperature of 6º C. The sun was 
positioned 22.5º above the horizon, bearing 142º true (NTSB, 2004). The Times 
called it a brilliant, blue sky (Kleinfield 2001). Belle Harbor residents are under a 
busy flight path for JFK departures, so they are used to seeing airliners pass 
overhead. Flight 587 was determined by the NTSB to have been viewed by a total 
of 354 witnesses that provided sufficient detail to document. More pertinently, the 
majority of witnesses were concentrated in Belle Harbor. It is extremely rare to 
have such a numerous, compact group unexpectedly observe a nearby low-
altitude airliner crash in good weather from all angles. The fact that these 
eyewitnesses must have had an emotional reaction to the disaster, and no doubt 
later watched TV news reports, and/or read newspaper accounts of the accident, 
and discussed their observations with others, before making their statements 
might seem to diminish their use in eyewitness research. It is known that human 
memory is strikingly susceptible to social (Wright, Memon, Skagerberg & 
Gabbert, 2009) and other sullying influences (Foster & Naylor 1999; Robins, 
2009). But since we are concerned with real world accident investigations this 
seeming contamination is the more expected condition, the reality of actual 
witness statements, and maybe gives archival methodology more validity than 
experimental techniques (Christianson, 1992). 
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Materials and Methods 
Recording witness statements was earnest work due to the number of 
fatalities and the immediate lack of a clear cause. Interviews were undertaken by a 
large number of NTSB, local police and FBI agents. Using the NTSB Witness 
Group Factual Report (Schiada, 2002) as a model, we created an Excel 
spreadsheet containing all 354 witness summaries. While there are considerable 
original records of the interviews, it was not recorded how the questions were 
posed, or what other reports (media/social) may have influenced the witness. Our 
dataset used only the original consensus NTSB Witness Group interpretation of 
each witness’s testimony. 
Our goal in constructing a dataset to analyze was to have the highest 
likelihood of finding reliability. By removing obvious outliers and controlling for 
geographic position we stood the best chance of discovering patterns. And if no 
patterns are found in this clean dataset, we strengthen the hypothesis that data 
from eyewitness reports are unreliable. We removed witnesses that were moving 
on boats, trains, planes or whose position was otherwise uncertain. We also 
removed witnesses who were many kilometers from the crash site, resulting in a 
dataset containing 239 Belle Harbor witnesses (defined as all ground witness 
between 149th Street and 108th Street). Coding the witness location into the 
dataset would allow us to control for position relative to the crash. We determined 
the geographic coordinates of the Belle Harbor witnesses using the information 
reported in the NTSB Appendixes A and B (street address or textual description 
of location) in combination with an examination of Google Earth and Google 
Street View. The resulting Keyhole Markup Language (KML) file is rendered as 
figure 2 using the USGS National Map Viewer. Location was initially coded into 
the spreadsheet using a city-block grid centered on the crash site at 131st Street 
and Newport Avenue. We then performed a matrix rotation, giving us witness 
location using Cartesian coordinates with origin at main crash site, abscissa as 
position left or right of aircraft track, and ordinate as position along aircraft track. 
We also converted the Cartesian coordinates into polar coordinates for analysis 
based on distance from the crash site. The data were now in a useful format to 
allow us to perform a series of statistical measures on the witness statements. 
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Figure 2. Belle Harbor Eyewitness Locations. 
marker shows the path of the main body of the aircraft. Each green marker is an 
eyewitness, the other red 
tip. 
 
Of the 239 Belle
airliner being on fire or not before it impacted the ground. 
the no-fire code was only
indicated he or she did not see any fire
(23%) that expressed no opinion on this question. 
witnesses that expressed a definite opinion,
cleanest, most reliable, witness 
Belle Harbor witnesses were not in agreement about the airliner being on 
fire or not before it impacted the ground. 
that reported either observing 
using RStudio 0.97.311 (R Core Team
The gray line ending in a red 
markers show final location of the engines and left wing 
Analysis 1: Fire 
 Harbor witnesses 183 expressed an opinion about the 
The NTSB stated that 
 “utilized in situations when a witness specifically 
” (Schiada, 2002, p. 4). This leaves 56 
Our analysis used only those 
 in a continuing attempt to collect the 
pool. 
The distribution of the 183 
no fire (65) or some fire (118) was investigated 
, 2012) and MATLAB 2011a (MATLAB
 
witnesses 
, 
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2011) software with all tests of significance at a p = .05 criterion. The majority 
opinion of all eyewitnesses expressing an opinion on pre-impact fire is 
statistically significant (using chi-square test with an equally divided fire/no-fire 
null hypothesis (χ² [1, N = 183] = 15.35, p < .001). Graphical mapping shows 
little discernable geographic pattern (figure 3). Separate logistic regression 
analyses with fire/no-fire as the binary categorical dependent variable and a 
geographic dimension (in km) as the independent (predictor) variable reveals no 
significant relationship along the abscissa (b = 0.39 p = .109), the ordinate (b = 
0.14 p = .788), or distance from the crash site (b = -0.22 p = .567). This confirms 
the intuitive conclusion from the graphical mapping that there is no preferred 
orientation for these eyewitness reports. Indeed, the overall distribution of the fire 
witnesses compared to no-fire witnesses appears by eye to be about the same. 
This more general assertion is harder to test, as the witness pool was drawn from a 
decidedly non-uniformly distributed population (on a peninsula, tending to be on 
busy streets or popular locations). 
 
 
Figure 3. Was there pre-impact fire? Witnesses that reported seeing pre-impact 
fire are in red, those that saw no fire in blue. The gray line is the flight path. Some 
locations jittered to prevent overplotting. 
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We investigated independence with a two-tailed two-dimensional paired 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Peacock’s algorithm (Peacock, 1983) determines 
whether two sets of data arise from the same or different distributions without 
making any assumptions of the distribution. While the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
has sometimes been considered a weak form of analysis, it has the required 
advantage here that it is non-parametric and distribution free. Use of Peacock’s 
test for multi-dimensional data sets is well established (Lopes, Reid & Hobson, 
2007). The null hypothesis is that both data sets are drawn from the same 
continuous distribution. For the fire/no fire distributions, the null hypothesis is not 
rejected (D = 0.167, p = 0.200), suggesting that indeed the fire and no-fire 
distributions are the same. 
Assuming the distribution of fire/no-fire witnesses to be uniform, we can 
calculate the results of polling smaller samples of witnesses from the group 
without regard to location. While the majority opinion is statistically significant, 
the variance is considerable. This becomes increasingly important when 
considering the small number of witnesses that view most aviation accidents. 
Applying hypergeometric distribution analysis to the dataset values, a poll of 5 
witnesses reveals a 24% probability that a majority of such a sample would have 
reported seeing no pre-impact fire (the opposite of the majority opinion in the 
population). With 10 witnesses there is still a 9% probability that a majority 
would report no fire, and a 92% probability that 2 of the 10 would report against 
the population majority opinion. Clearly the variance found in this compact 
eyewitness population means that eyewitness consensus in commonly sized 
witness samples is unlikely and that a majority of such a sample may disagree 
with the population majority opinion. 
As to location of the fire, Belle Harbor observers that saw fire offered 
varying details: 7% said there was a fire in the right engine, 7% in the right wing, 
6% in the tail, 41% in the fuselage, 9% in the left engine, 17% in the left wing, 
14% in a miscellaneous area, 4% in an undefined wing, and 4% in an undefined 
engine. The NTSB determined “witnesses who reported observing the airplane on 
fire were most likely observing a fire from the initial release of fuel or the effects 
of engine compressor surges” (NTSB, 2004). The engines themselves suffered no 
in-flight fire, and there was probably no other pre-impact fire. 
Analysis 2: Smoke 
Belle Harbor witnesses were not in agreement about the airliner leaving a 
smoke trail or not before it impacted the ground. The distribution of the 105 
witnesses that reported either no smoke (60) or some smoke (45) was investigated 
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using the same tools and methods. Again, graphical mapping shows no 
discernable geographic pattern (figure 4). The majority opinion of no smoke is not 
statistically significant using a chi-square test with a no preference null hypothesis 
(χ² [1, N = 105] = 2.14, p = .143). Logistic regression analyses show no 
significant relationship to the smoke/no smoke reports along the abscissa (b = 
0.30 p = .296) or the ordinate (b = -0.14 p = .818). There is an observed trend for 
an increased probability to report smoke with increasing distance from the crash 
site, but this was not statistically significant (b = 0.93 p = .066). A two-tailed two-
dimensional paired Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the null hypothesis 
that the two data sets are drawn from the same continuous distribution (D = 0.239, 
p = 0.200). 
 
 
Figure 4. Was there pre-impact smoke? Witnesses that reported seeing pre-impact 
smoke in red, those that reported no smoke in blue. The gray line is the flight 
path. 
Hypergeometric distribution analysis reveals that if five random witnesses 
were polled from the group, there is a 36% probability that a majority of them 
would have reported pre-impact smoke, the opposite of the no smoke majority 
with this population. With 10 witnesses there is still a 21% probability that a 
majority would report smoke, and a 97% probability that 2 of the 10 would report 
against the population majority opinion. 
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As to location of the pre-impact smoke, Belle Harbor observers that saw 
smoke offered varying details: 2% reported the right engine, 13% the right wing, 
7% the tail, 29% the fuselage, 9% the left engine, 7% the left wing, 42% from a 
miscellaneous area, 4% an undefined wing, and 2% an undefined engine. The 
NTSB report reached no conclusion about how much or from where the jetliner 
was emitting smoke prior to impact. 
Analysis 3: Noise 
The distribution of the 239 witnesses that reported either in-flight noise (156) or 
no noise (83) was investigated using the same tools and methods. Graphical 
mapping shows no discernable geographic pattern (figure 5). Logistic regression 
analyses show no significant relationship to the noise/no noise reports along the 
abscissa (b = -0.02 p = .287) or the ordinate (b = 0.01 p = .831). There is an 
observed trend for a decreased probability to report noise with increasing distance 
from the crash site; with about 70% of witnesses immediately adjacent to the 
crash site reporting hearing noise, decreasing to about 50% reporting noise when 
two kilometers (1.2 miles) away.  However this was not statistically significant (b 
= -0.04 p = .105). A two-tailed two-dimensional paired Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
does not reject the null hypothesis that the two data sets are drawn from the same 
continuous distribution (D = 0.210 p = 0.200). 
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Figure 5. Was there pre-impact noise? Witnesses that reported hearing pre-impact 
noise in red, those that reported no noise in blue. The gray line is the flight path. 
 The majority opinion of in-flight noise is statistically significant using a 
chi-square test with a no preference null hypothesis, (χ² (1, N = 239) = 22.30,  p < 
.001). Hypergeometric distribution analysis reveals that if five witnesses were 
randomly polled, there is a 23% probability that a majority of them would have 
reported no in-flight noise, the opposite of the in-flight noise majority with this 
population. With 10 witnesses there is still a 9% probability that a majority would 
report no noise, and a 92% probability that 2 of the 10 would report against the 
population majority opinion.  
Analysis 4: Explosion 
Forty-one (17%) of the Belle Harbor witness pool reported that in addition 
to noise, they heard a pre-impact explosion (or boom or loud pop). Geographical 
mapping shows no discernible pattern (figure 6), confirmed by logistic regression 
analyses that show no statistically significant relationship to the explosion/no-
noise reports along the abscissa (b = -.03 p = .282), the ordinate (b = -0.68 p = 
.228) or distance from the crash site (b = 0.30 p = .486). A two-tailed two-
dimensional paired Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the null hypothesis 
that the two data sets are drawn from the same continuous distribution (D = 0.182 
p = 0.200). 
The majority opinion of no explosion is statistically significant using a 
chi-square test with a no preference null hypothesis (χ² [1, N = 239] = 175.84, p < 
.001). Hypergeometric distribution analysis reveals that if five witnesses were 
polled from the group, there is a 4% probability that a majority of them would 
have reported a pre-impact explosion, the opposite of majority opinion with this 
population. This is a much lower probability that the other categories studied, but 
even in this case the probability of all five witnesses agreeing there was no 
explosion is only 61%. With 10 witnesses there is a 1.5% probability that a 
majority would report an explosion, and a 54% probability that 2 of the 10 would 
report against the population majority opinion. 
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 Figure 6. Was there a pre-impact explosion? Witnesses that reported a pre-impact 
explosion in red, those that reported no explosion in blue. The gray line is the 
flight path. 
 
Limitations 
This study is subject to all the limitations inherent in archival eyewitness 
research. This includes, but is not limited to, a limited sample size, a nonrandom 
sample, participant self-selection, no control for retention interval, eyewitnesses 
with varied vantage points, conflation of geographic position with other factors, 
multicollinearity, lack of control of eyewitness interviews, no control for 
emotional state, no control for post-observation social or media influence, 
possible limited generalizability of one specific type of accident to other aviation 
accidents, and an inability to manipulate variables. Interviews were conducted by 
three different organizations (local police/FBI/NTSB) at varying times using 
varying formats (written submissions/telephone/face-to-face) with no records of 
witness media or social exposure. The NTSB found disagreements between 
statements given to different investigators at different times (Schiada, 2002). And 
they noted that, “disagreement and direct conflicts also existed between 
statements from the same source (e.g. two or more police statements 
pertaining to the same witness)” (p.7). 
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Despite the methodological limitations, many authors have supported 
archival research as a naturalistic contribution to the use of multiple 
investigational techniques to uncover reality (Christianson, 1992; Christianson, 
Goodman & Loftus, 1992). 
Discussion 
Eyewitness reports to this airplane crash show considerable disparities. 
Even with over two hundred witnesses in a compact geographic area stating an 
observation, the variance was large enough to preclude forming a statistically 
significant conclusion about a basic large-scale event (was the aircraft trailing 
smoke). And while in three other cases a statistically significant conclusion could 
be reached from the large ‘clean’ dataset, the observed variances were still 
considerable. These quantitative results are in agreement with the apparent 
variability of eyewitness statements qualitatively reported for other widely 
observed aviation accidents. 
Furthermore, analysis of the geographic distribution of the witness group 
observations shows no significant pattern. Logistic regression showed no 
statistically significant structure for four types of observation along three possible 
dimensions of regularity. Two-tailed two-dimensional paired Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests showed that eyewitnesses reporting opposite observations were 
drawn from the same continuous distribution. We might expect some directions 
relative to the flight path of the aircraft to give a clearer view of an airborne event, 
or people closer to an event to be better (or worse) witnesses, but our findings 
show that in this case location of a witness does not appear to significantly affect 
the validity of major observations reported. The variance was evenly spread by 
geographic location within the witness pool. 
If the accident were to have been observed by only a small group of 
witnesses (as is common), there is considerable probability that the witnesses 
would not agree; and there is the possibility that a majority of the witnesses would 
report against the population majority. That small groups have a remarkably high 
chance of not following the population characteristics has been proven since 
Pascal’s Triangle in the 1600’s (Mlodinow, 2008); and the mistaken intuition that 
a small sample will accurately reflect underlying probabilities was called the law 
of small numbers by Kahneman and Tversky (1971). Thus, the findings for 
commonly sized small samples are not surprising. However, the inability to make 
a statistically significant conclusion about a basic large-scale event from the large 
(N > 200) sample is unexpected. 
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Combining the high variances, the lack of any preferred observational 
perspective and the law of small numbers, a conclusion of eyewitness unreliability 
for aviation crashes is unavoidable. Although they sound compelling — “I saw 
the crash with my own eyes” — a small group of witnesses to an aviation accident 
giving reports several days after the event may well not produce reliable 
information. This is demonstrated to be true for a crash as seemingly perceptible 
as a wide-body transport jet at low altitude in clear daylight conditions. Dr. Percy 
Walker’s claim that eyewitnesses to aviation accidents are almost always wrong is 
certainly not proven. But the current reported practice by accident investigators of 
placing low value to eyewitness accounts of aircraft crashes is supported by the 
empirical evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15
English and Kuzel: Reliability of eyewitness reports to a major aviation accident
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2014
 References 
 
Air Correspondent. (1962, March 11). 30 men who wait for an air crash. The 
Sunday Times, London, UK, p. 8.  
Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee (1993). Lauda Air Luftfahrt 
Aktiengesellschaft, Boeing 767-300ER, registration QE-LAV, Dan Chang 
district, Suphan Buri province, Thailand, 26 May B.E. 2534 (A.D. 1991). 
Thailand: Ministry of Transport and Communications. 
Altmann, E. M. (2003). Reconstructing the serial order of events: a case study of 
September 11, 2001, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 1067-1080. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/acp.986 
Brewer, N. & Wells, G. L. (2011). Eyewitness identification. Current Directions 
in Psychological Science, 20, 24-27. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721410389169 
Brown, V. (1962, September). Accident aftermath. Aviation and Space Magazine, 
38-39. 
Chan, J. C. K., Thomas, A. K., & Bulevich, J. B. (2009). Recalling a witnessed 
event increases eyewitness suggestibility. Psychological Science, 20(1), 
66-73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02245.x 
Christianson, S. (1992). Emotional memories in laboratory studies versus real-life 
studies: Do they compare? In M. A. Conway, D. C. Rubin, H. Spinnler, & 
W. A. Waganaar (Eds.), Theoretical perspectives on autobiographical 
memory (pp. 339-353). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7967-4_20 
Christianson, S., Goodman, J., & Loftus, E. F. (1992). Eyewitness memory for 
stressful events: Methodological quandaries and ethical dilemmas. In S. 
Chistianson (Ed.), The handbook of emotion and memory: Research and 
theory (pp. 217-241). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
CIAIAC. (2008). Interim report A-032/2008. Accident involving aircraft 
McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82 (MD-82), registration EC-HFP, operated 
16
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 1 [2014], Iss. 4, Art. 9
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol1/iss4/9
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2014.1040
by Spanair, at Madrid-Barajas airport on 20 August 2008. Madrid, Spain: 
Ministerio de Fomento. 
Dodge, R. E. (1983). Aircraft accident survivors as witnesses. Aviation, Space, 
and Environmental Medicine, 54(2), 165-167. 
Edelson, M., Sharot, T., Dolan, R. J., & Dudai, Y. (2011). Following the crowd: 
Brain substrates of long-term memory conformity. Science, 333, 108-111. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1203557 
Foster, A. R., & Naylor, K. (1999). Trauma and perceived culpability as factors in 
eye-witness accounts. Proceedings of the 4th International Conference of 
The Institute of Traffic Accident Investigators. Telford, UK. 73-79. 
Goodman, A., Todd, B., & Koch, K. (2008, August 20). Passengers reportedly 
saw flames before jet crashed, killing 153. Retrieved from 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/20/plane.crash.madrid/in
dex.html 
Halbfinger, D. M,, & Wald, M. L. (2003, January 9). 21 die in commuter plane 
crash in North Carolina. The New York Times. 
Johnson, S. S. (1991, May 29). Scavengers complicate crash probe. USA Today, 
p. 4A. 
Kelly, N., & Elliott, H. (1991, May 28). Baggage bomb is blamed for Thai air 
crash. The Times. 
Kleinfield, N. R. (2001, November 13). The crash of flight 587: The overview. 
The New York Times. 
Loftus, E. F. (1996). Eyewitness testimony: With a new preface by the author. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Lopes, R. H. C., Reid, I., & Hobson, P. R. (2007). The two-dimensional 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. XI International Workshop on Advanced 
Computing and Analysis Techniques in Physics Research, Amsterdam, 
Netherlands.  
MATLAB. (2011). MATLAB and Statistics Toolbox Release R2011a. Natick, 
MA: The Mathworks Inc. 
17
English and Kuzel: Reliability of eyewitness reports to a major aviation accident
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2014
McClellan, J. M. (2013). What you don’t know can . . .  Sport Aviation, 62(1), 84-
86. 
Memon, A., Mastroberardino, S., & Fraser, J. (2008). Münsterberg's legacy: What 
does eyewitness research tell us about the reliability of eyewitness 
testimony? Applied Cognitive Psychology, 22, 841-851. 
Memon, A, & Wright, D. B. (1999). Eyewitness testimony and the Oklahoma 
bombing. Psychologist, 12(6), 292-295. 
Mlodinow, L. (2008). The drunkard's walk: How randomness rules our lives. 
New York, NY: Pantheon. 
Münsterberg, H. (1908). On the witness stand: Essays on psychology and crime. 
Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Company. 
National Transportation Safety Board. (1972). Aircraft accident report, Hughes 
Air West DC-9, N9345, and U.S. Marine Corps F-4B, 151458, near 
Duarte, California, June 6, 1971. NTSB-AAR-72-26. Washington DC: 
National Transportation Safety Board. 
National Transportation Safety Board. (1987). Aircraft accident report, Midwest 
express airlines, inc., DC-9-14, N100ME, general Billy Mitchell field, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, September 6, 1985. NTSB/AAR-87/01. 
Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. 
National Transportation Safety Board. (1988). Aircraft accident report. Northwest 
airlines, inc., McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, N312RC, Detroit 
metropolitan wayne county airport, Romulus, Michigan, August 16, 1987. 
NTSB/AAR-99/05. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety 
Board. 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2000). Aircraft accident report. In-flight 
breakup over the Atlantic ocean, Trans World Airlines flight 800, Boeing 
747-131, N93119, near east moriches, New York, July 17, 1996. 
NTSB/AAR-00/03. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety 
Board. 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2004). Aircraft accident report, in-flight 
separation of vertical stabilizer, American Airlines flight 587, Airbus 
Industrie A300-605R, N14053, Belle Harbor, New York, November 12, 
18
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 1 [2014], Iss. 4, Art. 9
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol1/iss4/9
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2014.1040
2001. NTSB/AAR-04/04. Washington, DC: National Transportation 
Safety Board. 
National Transportation Safety Board. (2012). Probable cause report 
ERA11FA185. Retrieved from 
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief2.aspx?ev_id=20110311X65739&
ntsbno=ERA11FA185&akey=1 
Naughton, P., & Strange, H. (2008, August 20). 152 burnt to death in Madrid 
plane disaster. The Times. 
Peacock, J.A. (1983). Two-dimensional goodness-of-fit testing in astronomy. 
Monthly Notices Royal Astronomy Society, 202, 615-627. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mnras/202.3.615 
R Core Team. (2012). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R 
Foundation for statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. ISBN 3-900051-
07-0. http://www.R-project.org/. 
Robins, P. J. (2009). Eyewitness reliability on motor vehicle crashes: A primer for 
practitioners. (2nd ed). Tucson, AZ: Lawyers & Judges Publishing 
Company. 
Riniolo, T. C., Koledin, M., Drakulic, G. M., & Payne, R. A. (2003). An archival 
study of eyewitness memory of the Titanic's final plunge. Journal of 
General Psychology, 130(1), 89-95. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00221300309601277 
Rivas, B., & Bullen, A. (2008). John Derry: The story of Britian's first supersonic 
pilot (New Edition ed.). Yeovil, UK: Haynes Publishing. 
St. Jacques, P. L., & Schacter D. L. (2013). Modifying memory: Selectively 
enhancing and updating personal memories for a museum tour by 
reactivating them. Psychological Science, 24(4), 537-542. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797612457377 
Schiada, L. (2002). Witness group factual report: DCA02MA001. Washington, 
DC: National Transportation Safety Board. 
Schmechel, R. S., O’Toole, T. P., Easterly, C. & Loftus, E. F. (2006). Beyond the 
ken? Testing jurors’ understanding of eyewitness reliability evidence. 
19
English and Kuzel: Reliability of eyewitness reports to a major aviation accident
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2014
Jurimetrics, The Journal of Law, Science, and Technology, 46(2), 177-
214. 
Schulz, K. (2010). Being wrong: Adventures in the margin of error. New York, 
NY: Ecco Press. 
Simons, D, J., & Chabris, C. F. (2011). What people believe about how memory 
works: A representative survey of the U.S. population. PLoS ONE, 6(8), 
e22757. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0022757 
Staff. (1952, September 12). The Farnborough tragedy. Flight and Aircraft 
Engineer, LXII(2277), p. 334. 
Strauch, B. (2002). Investigating human error: Incidents, accidents, and complex 
systems. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.  
Toglia, M P., Reed, J. D., Ross, D. F., & Lindsay, R. C. (2006). The handbook of 
eyewitness psychology: Volume I: Memory for events. London, UK: 
Psychology Press. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971). Belief in the law of small numbers. 
Psychological Bulletin, 76(2), 105-110. 
Wald, M. L. (2002, June 23). For air crash detectives, seeing isn't believing. The 
New York Times, Section 4, p. 5. 
Wells, G. L., Memon, A., & Penrod, S. D. (2006). Eyewitness evidence: 
Improving its probative value. Psychological Science in the Public 
Interest, 7(2), 45-75. 
Wilkinson, S. (1977, July). Charade. Flying, 101(1), 120. 
Wood, R. H., & Sweginnis, R W. (2006). Aircraft Accident Investigation (2nd 
ed.). Casper, WY: Endeavor.  
Wright D. B., Memon A., Skagerberg E. M., & Gabbert F. (2009). When 
eyewitnesses talk. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 18, 174-
178. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01631.x 
Zaragoza, M. S. & Lane, S. M. (1994). Source misattributions and the 
suggestibility of eyewitness memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology 
20
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 1 [2014], Iss. 4, Art. 9
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol1/iss4/9
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2014.1040
Learning Memory and Cognition, 20, 934-945. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.20.4.934 
21
English and Kuzel: Reliability of eyewitness reports to a major aviation accident
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2014
